Safety-critical digital systems have been installed in nuclear power plants and thus their safety effect evaluation has become an emerging issue. The multi-tasking feature of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment could increase the risk factor because the I&C equipment affects the actuation of the safety functions in several mechanisms. In this study, we quantify the safety of the digital plant protection system in Korean nuclear power plants based on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology. Fifteen fault-tree models for the digital reactor-trip system and seven for the safety-feature actuation system are constructed and integrated into the plant safety assessment model. The result of the sensitivity study shows the boundaries of a plant risk and the effect of the digital equipment failures on the total plant risk.
I. Introduction
The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been widely used in the nuclear industry for a licensing and identifying the vulnerabilities to plant safety since 1975. Even though the PSA may have various objectives, it involves the basic tasks such as the definition of accident sequences, an analysis of plant systems and their operation, the collection of component data, and an assessment of accident-sequence frequencies. 1) Generally, in the nuclear industry, the coredamage frequency (CDF) of a nuclear reactor and the large early-release frequency (LERF) are the most popular metrics as surrogates to express the plant risk. The LERF implies the frequency of those accidents leading to significant, unmitigated releases from the containment in a time frame prior to effective evacuation of the close-in population, and consequently there is a potential for early health effects. 2) These metrics are calculated based on the PSA models.
On the other hand, the modern digital I&C technologies are expected to significantly improve the performance and the safety of nuclear power plants. 3) In particular, Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plants (KSNPPs), typically Ulchin 5 & 6 nuclear units, adopted the safety-critical digital systems such as a Digital Plant Protection System (DPPS) and a Digital Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (DESFAS), due to the obsolescence of the traditional analog components and the functional advantages of the digital systems. Since the early 1990s, however, there has been a considerable debate about the safety of digital applications in nuclear power plants. The report published by the National Research Council (1997) states that appropriate methods for assessing the safety and the reliability of these digital applications are the key to establishing an acceptability of the digital I&C systems in nuclear plants.
With the digital I&C equipment, there could be a risk concentration due to its multi-tasking features. The designs of safety-critical systems have adopted conservatism and have various functional redundancies through separated signal processing trains. In the case of digital systems, however, the software programs of many functions are executed by the same processor and the same software programs are installed in the redundant processors. In the case of the KSNPP, regarding a trip signal generation, the multiple trip parameters are processed in the DPPS. The actuation signals for the various accident-mitigation equipments are also generated by the DPPS and the DESFAS. The failure of an alarm generation in the DPPS will deteriorate the possibility of a human operator's manual action which could play the role of a backup for an automatic signal generation.
In consideration of the importance of a digitalized I&C system, the quantitative effect of its failure on the plant risk has not been well investigated yet. The first step of this study is the identification of the dominant risk factors caused by digital systems. These dominant factors should be selected based on the cutset analysis. In Chap. II, we will analytically derive the dominant cutsets and identify the dominant factors based on them.
In order to provide information regarding the boundaries of a plant risk and the effect of the dominating factors of digital equipment failure on the total plant risk, in this study, fifteen fault-tree models for the DPPS and seven for the DES-FAS were constructed and integrated into the plant safety assessment model. The quantification of the plant risk effect will be demonstrated by using the metrics of the CDF and the LERF focusing on the digital I&C system failures. This analysis is performed based on the KSNPP risk model which includes the fault trees of the DPPS and the DESFAS. In Chap. III, the development of the fault tree models and the process of sensitivity study will be described. The result of the sensitivity study will also be presented. In Chap. IV, we will discuss the analysis results.
II. Cutset Analysis
The purpose of the DPPS is an automatic generation of a trip signal for an emergency. In order to detect an emergency, it monitors various process parameters by using inde-pendent instrumentation and processing channels. The KSNPP adopts a four-channel layout as shown in Fig. 1 . Four redundant channels are provided to satisfy the single failure criterion and improve the plant availability. Each channel of the DPPS contains six microprocessor-based signal-processing modules and several input/output modules. The processor module performs a two-out-of-four voting for each process input provided by the four redundant instrumentation channels. It produces the output signal by using a dedicated digital output module. Its stall will result in a loss of its heart beat output signal to a watchdog timer, then the watchdog timer will force the DPPS trip and initiate trip sig- The function of the DESFAS is to provide an automatic signal processing in the case when engineering safety feature (ESF) signals are received from the DPPS based on a selective two-out-of-four logic. The DESFAS is comprised of two independent and redundant trains. The successful operation of one out of the two trains implies the successful functioning of the ESF. Figure 2 shows the schematic diagram of a signal flow from the DPPS through the DESFAS to the field actuators in a specific train. The two trains of the DESFAS receive the ESF actuation signals from the four channels of the DPPS independently.
Generally, the result of the fault-tree analysis is expressed in the form of a probability sum as follows:
where q i is the probability of minimal cutset i and p j is the probability of basic event j. The probability of a basic event in the fault tree is the failure probability of a corresponding component. 5) In Ref. 6) , the authors categorized the cutsets of multichannel protection systems into two groups: (1) Cutsets which include dependent events that result in multiple failures caused by the same reason and (2) Cutsets which consist of the possible combinations of independent events which make all channel unavailable. The group (1) can also be divided into three subgroups: (1a) Cutsets which disturb collecting input signals, (1b) Cutsets which disturb generating proper output signals, and (1c) Cutsets which cause the dis-tortion of processing results.
As described above, the DPPS and the DESFAS consist of four-channel or two-train redundancies. Therefore, we can easily expect that these redundancies make the probabilities of almost all the 'possible combinations of independent basic events' negligible because the order of the failure probabilities of the safety-grade digital modules is very low (usually less than 1E-3 per demand). That is, the cutsets in group (2) will be negligible. Then the group (1) cutsets which contain common cause failure (CCF) events become the main contributors to a system's unavailability. In Ref. 7) , the CCF events contribute 95% to the RPS unavailability. In the case of group (1c), we have to consider that the condition of the processor module is monitored by the watchdog timer. Conceptually, the dominant cutsets of a multi-channel digital protection system which consists of the CCF probabilities of digital modules and the error probability of a human operator can be expressed mathematically as follows: 6) q1
where Pr(OP) the probability that a human operator fails in a manual actuation ) . Among these variables, Pr(AI CCF) and Pr(DO CCF) are relatively easy to estimate because they consist of hardware components only. The remaining three variables were selected for the sensitivity study.
As explained in the previous chapters, the failure of an alarm generation in the DPPS will deteriorate the manual actuation performance since the alarms are the most important key information for the operator. It is hard to evaluate the human operator's failure probability in a precise manner because it depends on many variables such as the operating condition, training, experience, and time pressure.
The processor modules include the software. Usually, an identical software is installed in the redundant processor modules. It could be one of the most important contributors to the processor module CCF. Based on the 'error crystal' concept, 8) a software failure can be treated in a probabilistic manner. However, there are many difficulties in estimating ultra-high reliable software's failure probability. 9) Most safety-critical applications adopt fault-tolerant mechanisms in order to reduce the risk factor. If the fault-tolerant mechanisms are effective enough, the safety of the system and the plant risk will not be severely affected by a fail-ure of the processor modules. However, in the case of the watchdog-timer applications, we expect a relatively low fault detection probability.
Therefore, we consider three variables for the sensitivity study: the human failure probability, the software failure probability, and the watchdog-timer coverage.
III. Plant Risk Model and Sensitivity Study

Fault Tree Modeling
The aim of this fault tree modeling is to analyze the effect of the safety-critical digital systems on the plant risk. The fault trees for the digital systems, the DPPS and the DES-FAS, are newly developed and integrated into the conventional KSNPP risk model named the Risk Monitor developed by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. It consists of about 2,500 basic events and 3,500 logical gates.
The modeling assumptions for the DPPS and the DESFAS fault trees could be briefly summarized as follows. More detailed explanations can be found in Refs. 4) and 10):
(1) Since we do not have enough information about the failure modes of digital systems, all the failure modes are assumed to be hazardous. (2) For simplicity, we assume that the watchdog timers could detect software failures with the same coverage as in the case of hardware failures. (3) We ignore the fail-to-hazard probability of the network, the serial communications, and the inter-system data bus. (4) We assume that the components are tested at least once per month. We developed the fault trees for the DPPS which consist of 253 basic events and 2,886 logical gates, and those for the DESFAS which consist of 1,352 basic events and 1,693 logical gates. In order to integrate these fault trees into the Risk Monitor, we must perform the base analysis regard- ing the situation of each initiating event (IE). Anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) along the IEs could be summarized as in Table 1 if we assume that the diverse protection system (DPS) monitors the pressurizer's pressure. The detailed procedure of this base analysis is described in the Ref. 11).
Sensitivity Study
Using KwTree 12) which is the fault-tree analysis software package produced by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, we analyzed the developed plant-risk models.
For the selected three variables (the human failure probability, the software failure probability, and the watchdogtimer coverage), we performed a sensitivity study. Regarding the human failure probability, we used 1E-10, 0.05, 0.5, and 1.0. The first and the last cases represent the cases of an almost perfect human action and no human action, respectively. The second and third cases represent intermediate credits on the human operator.
Regarding the software failure probability, in this analysis, we examined the effect of the software of the LCL processor modules only. We used 0, 1E-4, and 1E-3 as the software failure probabilities. Since it is obvious that the software installed in the safety critical equipment is tested enough, we selected these three values for representing the level of software reliability.
Regarding the watchdog-timer coverage, we used 0.3, 0.7, and 0.9. In Ref. 13) , the estimated watchdog-timer coverage of a sample system ranged from 0.1 (for simple error detection algorithm) to 0.54 (for sophisticated algorithm). Since we expected that the error detection algorithms applied in a safety-critical system are more sophisticated than those of the sample system, we selected above three values for the sensitivity study.
The ideal case consists of a perfect software (0), a perfect operator (1E-10), and a high coverage of the watchdog timer (0.9). We calculate the relative values for the CDF and the LERF. That is, the results are expressed in the form of a ratio to the ideal case. The calculated results of the CDF and the LERF are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Figures 3 and 4 show the graphical illustrations of the results in the case of the watchdog-timer coverage of 0.7. The values shown in Tables  and Figs. are relative values comparing with the best case.
IV. Discussions
The results show that the CDF varies 13 times for the It is also notable that an optimistic result is obtained from the case of an almost perfect human operator who has the failure probability of 1E-10. The current situation makes it hard to attribute a high credit to the human operator action because the DPPS generates not only the automatic trip signals but also the key alarms. It means that, for the ultra-high reliable systems, we have to carefully consider the situation including the dependency between the automated signalgeneration systems and a human operator.
As shown in the sensitivity study results, in the case of a zero software failure and a highly credible operator backup, the effect of the watchdog timer is negligible. However, in the other cases, the watchdog-timer coverage plays a critical role. This result agrees well with authors' former research results. 6, 14) The results of this study can be utilized not only by a regulatory body but also by the designers of digital systems. In order to maintain a low risk level of a plant, the following items should be considered.
(1) The I&C system should be designed based on a dependency analysis between a human operator and a system. The operator training program for I&C failures will be helpful to the improvement of the plant safety. (2) In consideration of the total plant risk, there is a tradeoff among the variables as shown in Tables 2 and 3 . For example, we can compensate for the effort of providing a complete software program with a large coverage of a sophisticated monitoring mechanism. (3) The amount of risk metrics' changes along with the watchdog-timer coverage is quite small when the software failure probability is less than 1E-4.
V. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this study was to examine the effect of the safety-critical digital systems on the plant risk. Fault-tree models for the DPPS and the DESFAS in the KSNPP were developed and integrated into the KSNPP risk model, the Risk Monitor. The result of the sensitivity study shows the boundaries of the plant risk and reveals the effect of the digital equipment failures to the total plant risk.
The sensitivity study showed that the plant risk metrics, the CDF, and the LERF changed 13 times and 54.3 times along with a variation of the human operator's failure probability, the software failure probability, and the watchdogtimer coverage. The study suggests that we need to access the effect of the risk factor induced by the digital equipment in a more careful manner and to improve the system design for a reduced plant risk. Plant Risk Effect Analysis Focusing on Digital I&C Equipment Failures
